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Abstract
Throughout history, mankind has attempted to understand
nature in various ways.  The way one understands nature has a
deep influence upon one’s way of thinking and life.  The tradi-
tional understanding of nature in the West has been as an object,
or understood through the perspective of being. This has resulted
in an over-reliance on scientific reductionism. This is in contrast
to this is a more dynamic view of nature as becoming, which is
more common in the East. In this article I try to reconcile these
opposing views of nature; between being and becoming, deter-
minism and indeterminism, mechanism and holism, through the
approach of process philosophy.  Through such a synthesis of
these conflicting views, a new perspective of nature can be con-
structed which can hopefully lead us to a more harmonious inter-
action with our environment.
BEING / BECOMING
When considering the philosophy of nature, it is best to start with
the early Greek period, where we can see the beginnings of both philoso-
phy and science and the way they work together. The question concern-
ing the relationship between being and becoming has been asked not only
by philosophers but also by scientists. It can be traced back to the contro-
versy in the early Greek period between Heraclitus and Parmenides. Anna-
Teresa Tymieniecka, in her article The Ontopoiesis of Life as a New Philo-
sophical Paradigm, insists on the point that philosophers and scientists
should return to working together by quoting the words of Ren? Thom,
“even in science, ontology is necessary; metaphysics is not dead”
(Tymieniecka, 1998, p.17).  She also advocates this kind of relationship
and calls for an alliance between philosophy and science. She says,
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Nothing could be more hasty and erroneous. But also noth-
ing could be more preposterous than a philosopher who
believes it possible to reach reality through primary expe-
rience and the power of speculation while ignoring scien-
tific inquiry.  The striking fact of our present situation is
that philosophy needs to consult scientific data, inquiry,
methods in order to be able to grapple with reality. The
natural and human sciences in turn need a philosophy that
is appropriately informed by them for the more profound
organization and interpretation of their findings and their
own advance. (Tymieniecka, 1998, p.25)
Ilya Prigogine, in his book Order out of Chaos, accepted this as
one of the main problems in science and philosophy, “Science certainly
involves manipulating nature, but it is also an attempt to understand it, to
dig deeper into questions that have been asked generation after
generation….This is the question of the relationship between being and
becoming, between permanence and change” (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984,
p.291). Prigogine points out that the old science that emphasizes being
and denies becoming has found its own limitations. He says,
The denial of becoming by physics created deep rifts within
science and estranged science from philosophy. What had
originally been a daring wager with the dominant Aristo-
telian tradition gradually became a dogmatic assertion di-
rected against all those (chemists, biologists, physicians)
for whom a qualitative diversity existed in nature. At the
end of the nineteenth century this conflict had shifted from
inside science to the relation between ‘science’ and the
rest of culture, especially philosophy. (Prigogine &
Stengers, 1984, p.299)
The denial of becoming is also the denial of natural diversity, com-
plexity and novelty. With the birth of quantum mechanics, we know that
nature is full of unpredictable and unexpected surprises. Nature does not
stand as dead matter, or ‘out there’ to be explored without any interac-
tion.  Prigogine regarded quantum mechanics as the quest for the bridge
from being to becoming (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p.219). His at-
tempt to place becoming prior to being challenges traditional philosophy
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and science, which give priority to being. “The subsequent development
of Greek, medieval, and, to a considerable extent, modern philosophy
was dominated by the antinomy of Being and Becoming. In most, though
not in all, philosophical systems Being was given prominence while Be-
coming was placed in an inferior and subordinate role” (Edwards, 1967,
p.76). Prigogine challenges traditional science by giving priority to be-
coming, but while he departs from Parmenides, he does not totally agree
with Heraclitus. His approach seems to coincide more closely with
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism in that he tries to reconcile being
with becoming.  As he puts it: “initial conditions, as summarized in a state
of the system, are associated with Being; in contrast, the laws involving
temporal changes are associated with Becoming. In our view, Being and
Becoming are not to be opposed one to the other: they express two re-
lated aspects of reality” (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p.310). In quantum
theory, we cannot use either wave or particle to understand nature at the
subatomic level because it can represent both wave and particle. And in
this old tragic choice between being and becoming too, we cannot apply
either/or in order to understand nature because nature expresses itself in
the form of both being and becoming. At this point we deal with the
problem discussed by Whitehead as follows:
Abide with me;
Fast falls the eventide
Here the first line expresses the permanence, ‘abide’, ‘me’
and the ‘Being’ addressed; and the second line sets these
permanences amid the inescapable flux. Here at length we
find formulated the complete problem of metaphysics.
Those philosophers who start with the first line have given
us the metaphysics of ‘substance’; and those who start
with the second line have developed the metaphysics of
‘flux’. But, in truth, the two lines cannot be torn apart in
this way; and we find that a wavering balance between the
two is a characteristic of the greater number of philoso-
phers. (Whitehead, 1978, p.209)
Through the process view of nature, we may see the possibility
how being and becoming can work together. Our ambition, at this point,
is similar to some great philosophers who attempt to solve the conflict
left by Heraclitus and Parmenides. Empedocles explains Heraclitus’ change
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through two opposite cosmic powers __ love and strife __ and replaces
Parmenides’ being with the four distinct elements: water, earth, fire, and
air. Plato solves this problem by placing Parmenides’ being with the un-
changing reality beyond the visible world of Heraclitus’ flux. Plato, through
the allegory of the divided line, links being with mathematical truths, and
places becoming on the level of belief or doxa.  For Plato, becoming can
be only the shadow of truth. Aristotle, a member of Plato’s Academy,
explains the timeless truth with his concept of ‘substance’ as Whitehead
mentioned above as ‘the metaphysics of substance’. From Parmenidean
being to Platonic form and Aristotelian substance, this can explain the
main stream of the history of Western metaphysics, which was further
developed by Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, and others. It
seems that most Western philosophers have taken this path leading to a
timeless truth beyond the realm of becoming. But this placement of being
beyond becoming does not only happen in the Western philosophy but
also in the Eastern. Masao Abe, a Zen-Buddhist scholar, points out the
root of this problem. He says,
We human beings are living in a world in which every-
thing is changing. Everything including ourselves comes
to be, exists, for a time, and finally perishes. We, however,
cannot find satisfaction with this changing world because,
if everything is changeable and perishable our life is quite
unstable, uncertain, and restless, with nothing solid upon
which to rely. Accordingly, it is quite natural that from
ancient times, both in the East and the West, people have
searched for something unchangeable, something which
truly is, something solid and self-existing. ‘Substance’ is a
notion that was arrived at through this pressing quest. The
unchangeable being was grasped as ‘substance’. (Abe,
1997, p.85-86)
While ‘being’ as the timeless truth or unchangeable reality is con-
sidered as the ultimate goal of our searching, the nature surrounding us
seems to be involved in an endless activity of becoming. From scientific
discoveries, we realize that nature is as what Heraclitus taught two thou-
sand years ago. Even though we know much more precisely and accu-
rately than the ancient Greek philosophers did, we cannot overlook what
our predecessors especially Heraclitus have taught. Karl Popper summa-
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rizes Heraclitus ideas as follows:
Things are not really things, they are processes, they are
in flux. They are like fire, like a flame which, though it
may have a definite shape, is a process, a stream of matter,
a river. All things are flames: fire is the very building mate-
rial of our world; and the apparent stability of things is
merely due to the laws, the measures, which the process
in our world are subject to. (Miller, 1985, p.235)
Whitehead also used this idea of Heraclitus as a guideline to dis-
cuss the chief topic in metaphysics. He writes: “Without doubt, if we are
to go back to that ultimate, integral experience, unwrapped by the
sophistications of theory, that experience whose elucidation is the final
aim of philosophy, the flux of things is one ultimate generalization around
which we must weave our philosophical system….The elucidation of
meaning involved in the phrase ‘all things flow’ is one chief task of meta-
physics”. (Whitehead, 1978, p.208)
From Popper’s interpretation and Whitehead's metaphysics we
can understand how becoming plays the central role in process thought.
Prigogine accepts both being and becoming as two related aspects. The
starting point of our creative insights should begin with our considering
nature as ‘process’ rather than ‘thing’. According to the process view of
nature, all things do not stand as separated entities but in nature every-
thing is interdependent and participates in process. David Bohm also agrees
with this starting point, as he puts it: “In order to see the world from the
side of its being a unity, we must start from the notion that the basic
reality is the totality of actually existing matter in the process of becom-
ing” (Bohm, 1957, p.168). And Bohm also helped us clarify the root of
the term ‘thing’, which alerts us to why we have to replace ‘thing’ with
‘process’.
Now the word ‘thing’ goes back to various old English words
whose significance includes ‘object’, ‘action’, ‘event’, ‘condition’, ‘meet-
ing, and is related to words meaning ‘to determine’, ‘to settle’, and, per-
haps, to ‘time’ or ‘season’. The original meaning might thus have been
‘something occurring at a given time’, or under certain conditions. All
these meanings indicate that the word ‘thing’ arose as a highly general-
ized indication of any form of existence, transitory or permanent, that is
limited or determined by conditions. (Bohm, 1980, p.54)
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Prigogine explains nature in terms of the process of becoming
which agrees with the irreversible process of the second law of thermo-
dynamics. Even though chance or randomness plays a central role in this
process, it does not mean that there is no place for stability, permanence,
and order. If we consider his evolutionary process at equilibrium without
any fluctuations, nature will have some degree of autonomy and stability
in the process of becoming (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p.300). In this
mode of existence, nature has to be conceptualized in the form of ‘things’.
This means that being can be understood ‘within’ the process of becom-
ing. But we have to be careful in taking this as a new perspective of
nature. When we conceptualize nature in the form of ‘things’, we have to
be aware that the stability of this fixed concept is just temporary and that
no given thing can have a complete autonomy in its mode of being be-
cause its basic characteristics relate to other things in the process of be-
coming.  We always fail to notice that our concepts of ‘things’ are only
images of our past perceptions in our minds. We may be trapped again if
we treat some concepts as independently existing reality. We have to be
conscious that our knowledge has to be involved in the living process of
becoming that is taking place at the present moment. We are entangled in
the process, and any fixed concepts we abstract are only approximate and
temporary images under some conditions in the world of becoming. On
the contrary, if we hold that all things flow without autonomy and any
moment of stability, they will lose their essential significance and cannot
be understood. However, being, autonomy, stability, things, could not be
understood in terms of substance according to traditional meaning which
is eternal, unchanging, immutable, and self-existing. But being has to be
understood and taken into part of the process of becoming. We have a
concept of being as ‘things’ by abstracting from the process of becoming.
In this process, Bohm explains how being in becoming is possible:
We conclude, then, that we must finally reach a stage in
every theory where we introduce the notion of something
with unvarying and exhaustively specifiable modes of be-
ing, if only because we cannot possibly take into account
all the inexhaustibly rich properties, qualities, and rela-
tionships that exist in the process of becoming. At this
point, then, we are making an abstraction from the real
process of becoming. Whether the abstraction is adequate
or not depends on whether or not the specific phenomena
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that we are studying depend significantly on what we have
left out. With the further progress of science, we are then
led through a series of such abstractions, while furnish
ever better representations of more and more aspects of
matter in the concrete and real process of becoming.
(Bohm, 1957, p.156-157)
When we make abstractions from the real process of becoming,
we have to realize that these concepts are to allow us to see the unique-
ness of things, but that these concepts must also be understood through
the interrelation of all things in the real process of becoming. Without
being, we will not have any single idea about things. Without becoming,
all things are merely dead matter in a cosmic machine. In order to under-
stand living nature, we have to be aware of conceptualizing things through
our abstractions under some conditions and limitations, and these condi-
tions must be viewed under the process of becoming of the larger system
of the universe. With this perspective, beings will interact with becoming
in the same process, as Prigogine puts it: “Today physics has discovered
the need to assert both the distinction and interdependence between units
and relations. It now recognizes that, for an interaction to be real, the
'nature' of the related things must derive from these relations, while at the
same time the relations must derive from the ‘nature’ of things” (Prigogine
& Stengers, 1984, p.95). All concepts have to be understood through
their limitations. Modern science attempted to reach a complete descrip-
tion of nature without realizing the complexity and novelty of nature in
the process of becoming. We always situate in the context where we are,
and also the same for any concept that we try to abstract. Maurice Merleau-
Ponty proposes the idea of ‘Lebenswelt’, the ‘life-world’ in contrast to
the objective world of science. In his article What is Phenomenology? he
writes: “the phenomenological world is not the bringing to explicit of a
pre-existing truth, but, like art, the art of bringing truth into being”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1967, p.373). What he is concerned with is not to con-
ceptualize the essential meaning of phenomenon, but to reflect on what is
revealed to our perception in concrete situations. Thought is always situ-
ated in history and society. The meaning of what we experience should
not be based on a conceptual fixation of essence transcending our mun-
dane experience.  Thus any single concept must be viewed under some
conditions, and with this limitation it cannot be applied to all spheres of
the universe. Bohm reminds us of the limits from our abstraction, and a
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better understanding about nature should come from our acceptance of
the richness of nature. He says,
The notion of a thing is thus seen to be an abstraction, in
which it is conceptually separated from its infinite back-
ground and substructure. Actually, however, a thing does
not and could not exist apart from the context from which
it has thus been conceptually abstracted. And therefore
the world is not made by putting together the various
‘things’ in it, but, rather, these things are only approxi-
mately what we find on analysis in certain contexts and
under suitable conditions.
To sum up, then, the notion of the infinity of nature leads
us to regard each thing that is found in nature as some
kind of abstraction and approximation. It is clear that we
must utilize such abstractions and approximations if only
because we cannot hope to deal directly with the qualita-
tive and quantitative infinity of the universe. The task of
science is, then, to find the right kind of things that should
be abstracted from the world for the correct treatment of
problems in various contexts and sets of conditions…
Scientific research thus brings us through an unending
series of such revision in which we are led to conceptual
abstractions of things that are relatively autonomous in
progressively higher degrees of approximation, wider
contexts, and broader sets of conditions. (Bohm, 1957,
p.146)
According to Bohm’s point of view, we now understand more
about the limitations of modern science, which denies becoming and at-
tempts to grasp the essential nature of being. But we are beginning to
understand that nature is involved in a process of becoming, and being is
only abstracted from this process. Being in becoming can represent a new
perspective on nature. The mode of being can help us identify things and
make the distinction among things by which we abstract from the process
of becoming. We create abstractions in the same manner we make a map.
If we have no map, we will not know where we are and where we can go.
But we have to keep in mind that maps are only maps not the real terres-
trial world. Reality is not in our maps but in our real existence, a living
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stream of dynamic reality. We should allow ourselves be carried along by
this current.
DETERMINISM / INDETERMINISM
The problem of determinism and indeterminism can be regarded
as one of the main problems in the Western philosophy. This problem has
remained at the root of the Western thought since the early Greek phi-
losophy. The problem of determinism has been discussed among philoso-
phers for thousands of years. Prigogine, in his book The End of Cer-
tainty, opens the first chapter by focusing on the problem of determinism
and gave us a new light as follows:
Is the universe ruled by deterministic laws? What is the
nature of time? These questions were formulated by the
pre-Socratics at the very start of Western rationality. Af-
ter more than twenty-five hundred years, they are still with
us. However, recent developments in physics and math-
ematics associates with chaos and instability have opened
up different avenues of investigation. We are beginning to
see these problems, which deal with the very position of
mankind in nature, in a new light, and can now avoid the
contradictions of the past. (Prigogine, 1997, p.9)
To inquire into this problem, we can trace back to the early Greek
period. In the history of philosophy, many philosophers considered this
problem and have given us various answers. Prigogine persuades us to
rethink the search for the proper answer to this problem in our period.
The answer we attempt to find comes from the limitations of a modern
worldview influenced by the Newtonian theory. In the centuries follow-
ing Newton's discoveries, many descriptions of the universe were more
or less dominated by Newtonian physics. Newton stood as one of the
great thinkers in the world and his worldview influenced the people both
directly and indirectly for centuries. We will consider the result of
Newtonian worldview relevant to the problem of deterministic view of
nature. Paul Davies, in his book God and the New Physics, described
some general characteristics of determinism promoted by the Newtonian
theory as the following:
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In the old Newtonian theory, every atom moves along a
trajectory that is uniquely determined by the forces which
act on it. The forces in turn are determined by other at-
oms, and so on. Newtonian mechanics permits, in prin-
ciple, the accurate prediction of everything that will ever
happen on the basis of what can be known at one instant.
There is a rigid network of cause and effect, and every
phenomenon, from the tiniest jiggle of a molecule to the
explosion of a galaxy, is determined in detail long in ad-
vance. It was this conception of mechanics that led Pierre
de Laplace (1749-1827) to declare that if a being knew at
one instant the positions and notions of every particle in
the universe he would have at his disposal all the informa-
tion necessary to complete the entire past and future his-
tory of the universe”. (Davies, 1983, p.136)
Newtonian mechanistic worldview painted the picture of the uni-
verse as gigantic clockwork composed of many different parts, which
moved in a steady state. All things were seen as nothing more than com-
ponent parts of the huge cosmic machine. Determinism in this sense car-
ries the implication that we can know exactly and accurately about the
past and the future if and only if we have enough knowledge at the present
state. It means that everything which will happen in the future of the
universe is completely determined by its present state, and at the same
time we can retrodict what happened in the past by our present position
like setting a clock. Heinz R. Pagels, in his book The Cosmic Code, could
help us understand more about the general characteristics of determinism
from his explanation.
According to determinism, the universe may be viewed as great
clockwork set in motion by a divine hand at the beginning of time
and then left undisturbed. From its largest to its smallest motions
the entire material creation moves in a way that can be predicted
with absolute accuracy by the laws of Newton. Nothing is left to
chance. The future is as precisely determined by the past as is the
forward movement of a clock….The wheels of the great world
clock turn as indifferent to human life as the silent motion of the
stars. In a sense, eternity has already happened. (Pagels, 1982,
p.16)
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The Newtonian deterministic description of nature once inspired
some thinkers to dream on being omniscient, that is, to know the ‘mind of
God’. But such a beautiful dream was terminated by a sudden shock from
Einstein’s theories of relativity and quantum mechanics. Although Einstein
took the side of determinism throughout his entire life, we still consider
him as the great challenger to the Newtonian physics. We should also
treat quantum theory as the turning point of the great departure from
determinism to indeterminism.  Popper considers the ambition of the old
deterministic worldview as a daydream of omniscience, which leads, ap-
parently, to an inescapable nightmare (Miller, 1985, p.257). Sir James
Jeans also compared determinism with a prison and quantum theory with
a home in which it might, at least, be possible for us to mould events to
our desires and live our lives of endeavor and achievement.  (Jeans, 1981,
p.216). Thus the Newtonian mechanical model, presenting the world as a
huge machine, seems not to be a proper worldview in this period. The
Newtonian worldview may be appropriate for the world of industry, which
adopts the perspective of mechanical order.  Every part of the mechanism
has to repeat its own function regularly without any novelty and creativ-
ity. Chance and randomness were exceptional cases, which have to be
controlled and shaped into regular mechanical order.  Frederick Ferr?
points out extensively the negative consequences of the Newtonian de-
terministic view. He says:
If we venerate the qualities implicit in the image of the
Perfect Machine __ those of regularity, predictability, con-
trol __ we lose the values of spontaneity, creativity, re-
sponsibility. And those are the values of the personal. If all
reality should be seen and felt as perfectly regular clock-
work, with each happening being determined by its pre-
ceding circumstances, then we are not free to do other-
wise than whatever it is we find ourselves actually doing.
We are then not responsible agents, capable of initiating
chains of events, but we are only necessary links in the
causal sequence which looms indefinitely into the future
and ties us remorselessly to the conditions of the
past….Personal responsibility falls victim to the determin-
istic ideals of regularity and predictability. And with this
loss come serious social and psychological consequences
for modern civilization. Human beings, perceived as with-
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out essential responsibilities or need for personal creativ-
ity, will more easily be placed into economic bondage to
assembly-line production techniques; overwhelming bu-
reaucracies will show less communication in mechanically
administering our lives not only without spontaneity but
(worse) without personal assumption of moral account-
ability, from birth to burial. (Ferre, 1988, p.89-90)
However, the Newtonian deterministic model fails when it ex-
tends to the larger scale of the universe and also to the subatomic particle
level. It seems to be that quantum theory, according to Bohr’s principle
of complementarity and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, removes radi-
cally Newtonian deterministic worldview and replaces necessity with
chance, certainty with probability. John Briggs and F. David Peat, in the
book Turbulent Mirror, considered quantum mechanics as an indetermi-
nate invasion shaking an old deterministic worldview of some scientists.
If the world is strictly deterministic, then all events are locked in a chain
of cause and effect. This means that the necessary connection of cause-
and-effect determinism can be applied for all realms from an insect to a
star. In other words, everything in nature is the result of fixed laws. But
Briggs and Peat showed us the failure of such a belief. They say,
Two pots of soup heated on a stove under exactly the
same conditions will behave differently. Conditions for
dynamical systems are never identical, but for the most
part we can ignore differences with impunity because they
don't become magnified, turning the familiar into the cha-
otic. We have traditionally appreciated the simple regular-
ity of order in our familiar world, neglecting the infinitely
higher orders (or chaos) woven within it. (Briggs & Peat,
1989, p.76)
Quantum mechanics has drastically changed our view of nature
from the Newtonian deterministic mechanical order to an indeterminate
principle. Sir James Jeans explained metaphorically this radical change of
perspective from Newtonian determinism to quantum indeterminacy by
saying that the ultimate particles of matters would be seen to move, not
like railway trains running smoothly on tracks, but like kangaroos hop-
ping about in a field. His comparison of Heisenberg’s quantum leaps with
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kangaroo hopping signified the end of thinking of particles as being in
continuous motion. He also stated the result of the end of continuity, “As
discontinuity marched into the world of phenomena through one door,
causality walked out through another” (Jeans, 1981, p.127). We may have
to rethink what we understand about the principle of causality with the
rise of the quantum indeterminate principle. To criticize the deterministic
worldview does not mean that we hold the idea of an arbitrary universe of
pure chance. When we deny the linear causality of determinism, it does
not mean that the universe is lawless and irrational. On the contrary, we
are looking forward to finding a proper way to understand nature in a
new form of rationality. Tymieniecka expressed her own point of view
about the new form of order relating to our new vision of nature as fol-
lows:
Today’s science is, indeed, offering us a new vision of the
universe, nature, society. In fact, the chaotic and turbulent
stream, the innumerable streamlets which make up cos-
mos, nature, life, society and culture, in which from arbi-
trariness, chaos, chance there emerges segments of or-
dered world, such that we may acknowledge through our
own existence in relatively stable societal, natural, cosmic
existential conditions, opens fascinating newly to be for-
mulated issues, views, expectations.  The preeminence
given to the turbulent, fluid, accidental, irregular, disor-
derly in the origination and progress of All does not mean,
as I have hinted at a few times, a universal ‘disorder’ or a
forsaking of order and rationality. On the contrary, it opens
vistas in which we have to ask after the kinds, rules, ways
of interlinking, of intermingling, molding….There are no
sharp divides between matter and life, nature and the cos-
mos, nature and human culture, but vast intermediary
spheres which fascinate our imagination. (Tymieniecka,
1998, p.24-25)
We have to accept the role of chance proposed by quantum theory
playing at the subatomic level, and on the man-sized scale Newtonian
deterministic still has a narrow place to play. The main point we refuse
determinism is its omniscience, and its ambition to accomplish a com-
plete description of nature. Paul Davies, in his book The Mind of God,
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asserted that both determinism and chance played a role in the different
scales of the universe.
There is a difference between the role of chance in quan-
tum mechanics and the unrestricted chaos of a lawless
universe. Although there is generally no certainty about
the future states of a quantum system, the relative prob-
abilities of the different possible states are still determined.
Thus the betting odds can be given that, say, an atom will
be in an excited or a non-excited state, even if the out-
come in a particular instance is unknown. This statistical
lawfulness implies that, on a macroscopic scale where
quantum effects are usually not noticeable, nature seems
to conform to deterministic laws. (Davies, 1992, p.31)
Davies explanation is related to what we hope to see when deter-
minism and indeterminism have each own place to play in nature.
Prigogine, in his study of the second law of thermodynamics, at far-from-
equilibrium condition with irreversible process, attempted to find an in-
termediate description that lies somewhere between the two alienating
images of a deterministic world and an arbitrary world of pure chance
(Prigogine, 1997, p.189). His effort was put into an evolutionary process
where determinism and indeterminism co-exist in different parts of the
same process.  In Prigogine’s evolutionary process, determinism works
appropriately if and only if there is no fluctuation, and systems are in
equilibrium. But if systems with some fluctuations move from equilib-
rium to nonequilibrium and reach a bifurcation point, chance and ran-
domness will play a central role. At the bifurcation point, the roles of
dissipative structures will dramatically change the whole system into a
new form of order which we cannot predict accurately and know pre-
cisely in advance.  Within the construct of dissipative structure, nature at
the bifurcation point is opened for all possibilities.  Prigogine also says,
“Let us now look more closely at the critical effect of fluctuations. As we
have seen, near-equilibrium fluctuations are harmless, but far from equi-
librium, they play a central role. Not only do we need irreversibility, but
we also have to abandon the deterministic description associated with
dynamics” (Prigogine, 1997, p.68). For him, determinism cannot play
regularly and eternally in the whole process as in the mechanistic
worldview. But it can play only in a narrow place between bifurcations at
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near equilibrium in dynamical processes. The stability of dynamical sys-
tems at equilibrium can help us abstract the deterministic laws of nature,
otherwise we will have no concepts of nature. But the fixed laws we use
have to be kept in our minds for their limited periods of time. We have no
deterministic laws that can apply to all cases in the evolving universe.
Bohm contested the basic traditional Western beliefs in certainty and uni-
versality of deterministic laws approaching the complete description of
nature. He argues:
If we take into account the character of the laws of phys-
ics implied by the qualitative infinity of nature, however,
we can immediately answer this question in the negative.
For, as we have seen, the notion of a law that gives a
perfect one-to-one mathematical correspondence between
well-defined variables in the past and in the future, is only
an abstraction, good enough to described limited domains
of phenomena for limited periods of time, but, neverthe-
less, not valid for all possible domains over an infinite
time….Thus, we are not justified in making unlimited ex-
trapolations of any specific set of laws to all possible do-
mains and over infinite periods of time. This means that
the description of the laws of nature as in principle com-
pletely reversible is merely a consequence of an exces-
sively simple representation of reality. When we consider
the mechanical laws in their proper contexts of ever-chang-
ing basic qualities, it becomes clear that irrevocable quali-
tative changes do take place, which could not even in prin-
ciple be reversed. This is because, for systems of appre-
ciable complexity, the fundamental character of the laws
that apply cannot be completely separated from the his-
torical processes in which these systems come to obtain
their characteristic properties. (Bohm, 1957, p.162-163)
According to Bohm’s description, we probably have to shape our
own thoughts about the laws of physics. We once firmly believed that we
could reveal the inner secrets of the universe with a single formulation.
We have to leave our old dream of the deterministic complete description
and be open to seeing chance and randomness playing in our lives and
nature surrounding us. Popper compares the two different images of de-
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terminism and indeterminism with a clock and a cloud. He keeps indeter-
minism in his mind, but allows a narrow path for determinism to walk.
His proposal is similar to Prigogine’s evolutionary process where deter-
minism and indeterminism co-present. “What we need for understanding
rational human behavior __ and indeed, animal behavior __ is something
intermediate in character between perfect chance and perfect determin-
ism __ something intermediate between perfect clouds and perfect clocks.
And we also know that our clouds are not perfectly chancelike, since we
can often predict the weather quite successfully, at least for short pe-
riod”. (Miller, 1985, p.263)
According to Prigogine’s evolutionary process, we cannot choose
either determinism or indeterminism in order to take into account nature.
We have to use both in order to understand the whole process, as Alvin
Toffler stated in the Foreword of ‘Order out of Chaos’.  Toffler requests
us to put forth new efforts to recognize the co-presence of both chance
and necessity, not with one subordinate to the other, but as full partners in
a universe (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p.xxiii). According to the
Newtonian mechanistic worldview, chance and randomness are excep-
tional cases because deterministic order plays the central role in a me-
chanical system.  But for Prigogine, chance and randomness play the cen-
tral role, and deterministic order is a part of the process, which plays in a
short range between bifurcations.  Karim Ahmed, in his article Causality,
Chaos, and Consciousness, described the role of dissipative structures
causing apparent randomness and chance within all systems. He extends
this view by mentioning Giorgio Careri’s Order and Disorder in Matter,
which is correspondent to Prigogine’s explanation of bifurcations. He
says,
Chance plays a decisive role in the choice of new struc-
tures, by taking the system farther and farther away from
equilibrium in an unpredictable direction. Thus the forced
evolution of the system from one new structure to an-
other must in part have a ‘historical’ character because of
the influence of the preceding situation, but it also has a
‘nondeterministic’ character caused by the series of bifur-
cations it must come across….This gives the system sev-
eral alternative possibilities of evolution that cannot be
predicted because each branch of bifurcation is selected at
random at the moment of instability (first emphasis in origi-
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nal). (Ahmed, 1998, p.258)
According to Prigogine’s evolutionary process, deterministic lin-
ear causality cannot be applied to the far-from-equilibrium condition at
bifurcation.  Deterministic linear causality can explain only the dynamic
at an equilibrium condition where small causes produce small effects. At
bifurcation, on the contrary, a small cause can probably amplify an effect
to the large system and sometimes can cause extreme changes to the
whole. The amplification of small causes strongly effects larger systems.
This is supported by the new discovery of Edward Lorenz, a research
meteorologist and mathematician working at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, who attempts to explain metaphorically nonlinear dynamical
system with the Butterfly Effect. Lorenz’s Butterfly Effect is based on the
notion that a butterfly flapping its wings in Asia today can transform storm
systems next month in the Atlantic.  A small fluctuation at a bifurcation
point can cause a revolution like the stirring air of a butterfly. James Gleick,
in his book Chaos: Making a New Science, considers the Butterfly Effect
as the starting point of a new revolution causing the unexpected change
of systems. “In science as in life, it is well known that a chain of events
can have a point of crisis that could magnify small changes. But chaos
meant that such points were everywhere. They were pervasive. In sys-
tems like the weather, sensitive dependence on initial conditions was an
inescapable consequence of the way small scales intertwined with large”
(Gleick, 1987, p.23).
Causality, according to the traditional meaning, is a very limited
explanation of the connection between cause and effect. The linear causal
explanation describes events in a narrow scope and attempts to apply the
theory to all realms of phenomena. It may be a correct understanding in
one place and a period of time, but it cannot be applied to all places and
all periods of time. Consequently, the non-linear causal principle can prob-
ably open our minds, extend our limited scope and take the various pos-
sible causes into our consideration on account of the complexity of na-
ture. Thus the non-linear causal explanation seems to be appropriate for a
new perspective of nature.
Briggs and Peat attempt to expand the meaning of causality to
cover the larger part of the universe when they say, “We ordinarily think
of an effect as having only one or a few causes. In fact, the cause for any
one thing is everything else. To understand completely the cause of ma-
laria in humans, for example, requires understanding not only the life
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cycle of the anopheles mosquito, but also evolution, ecology, chemistry,
and eventually everything in the universe” (Briggs & Peat, 1984, p.96).
Bohm also discusses the problem of causality resulting from the deter-
ministic view of nature, and he explains why we have to rethink the linear
explanation of our old scientific beliefs. In order to know the real cause,
we might have to enlarge our view to all related parts in the complexity of
nature. Bohm argues,
We see, then, that the behavior of the world is not per-
fectly determined by any possible purely mechanical or
purely quantitative line of causal connection. This does
not mean, however, that it is arbitrary. For if we take any
given effect, we can always in principle trace it to the causes
from which its essential aspects came. Only as we go fur-
ther and further back into the past, we discover three im-
portant points: viz. First, that the number of causes which
contribute significantly to a given effect increases without
limit; secondly that more and more qualitatively different
kinds of causal factors are found to be significant; and
finally, that these causes depend on new contingencies lead-
ing to new kinds of chance… Thus, over an infinite period
of time, the determination of even the essential features of
an effect is evidently not purely mechanical, because it
involves not only an infinite number of contingent factors
but also an infinity of kinds of qualities, properties, laws
of connection, all of which themselves undergo fundamen-
tal changes with the passage of time. (Bohm, 1957, p.159-
160)
From Bohm’s point of view, we obviously cannot reduce the uni-
verse into pieces in order to understand, without seeing, the interconnec-
tion of all parts in the universe. We have to listen to Briggs and Peat’s
explanation about causality from malaria to ecology. Bohm accepts the
complexity of nature and argues for the relevance of everything. Ahmed
suggests that we reconsider causal explanation by expanding broadly to
cosmological context.  He says,
To expand such a causal scheme to its logical conclusion,
we should view it from a more cosmological context….For
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example, the preservation of the human beings and the
biosphere depends upon a mutual web of causal intercon-
nections between different species on earth __ e.g., the na-
ture of the food chain, material resources, energy fluxes,
ecosystem dynamics, etc. In such a biosphere model, the
causal interconnections are the vast proliferation of ex-
tinct and living species, that continue to be related to each
other over time and space. (Ahmed, 1998, p.257)
With determinism, we once had a beautiful dream of decoding the
mystery of the universe. We attempted to attain the complete description
of nature, to be omniscient and to be able to control and master nature.
But nature is not our slave who always obeys to our commands. Prigogine
quoted Vladimir Nobokov’s statement, “What can be controlled is never
completely real; what is real can never be completely controlled”
(Prigogine, 1997, p.154). Determinism, in the absolute sense, has no room
for chance, novelty and creativity because they are beyond our control.
Deterministic ideology rises with the desire to achieve a quasi-divine point
of view in our description of nature. But, for Prigogine, no human mea-
surements, no theoretical predictions, can give us initial conditions with
infinite precision in order to retain the idea of determinism (Prigogine,
1997, p.38). The deterministic worldview, which many scientists sup-
ported, collapses, not because of some new philosophy or ideology, but
because of the internal development of science itself.
From scientific inquiry, we realize that nature cannot be wholly
understood by the deterministic worldview. But we, at the same time,
cannot champion the idea of an arbitrary universe of pure chance. Even if
we know that chance and randomness play the central role in nature, by
no means do we have to totally abandon the deterministic view. If nature
is expected to be understood in terms of ‘process’ rather than ‘thing’, we
will see the possibility that chance and necessity co-exist in the same pro-
cess. Prigogine proposes the way to reconcile determinism with indeter-
minism in the irreversible process with the arrow of time. Determinism
can work only between bifurcations in a dynamical system at equilibrium
where there is no fluctuation. Indeterminism has to be taken into consid-
eration at bifurcation where the dissipative structures play the central
role. At bifurcation, the deterministic causal explanation breaks down
and fails to give an account of nature. We need some changes from linear
to nonlinear causal explanation like Lorenz’s Butterfly Effect. Then, we
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have to keep in mind the limitation of deterministic causal explanation
that works in specific places and periods of time. The deterministic
worldview with some fixed laws can help us conceptualize and under-
stand only some parts of the whole process of nature. If the nature we
understand is not a clock but a cloud full of surprises, novelty and cre-
ativity, we need an unending process in making a dialogue, not a mono-
logue, with nature.
Determinism in indeterminism, therefore, can be taken into con-
sideration as our new vision of nature. With this vision, we will see the
interplay between determinism and chance. Nature is not dead matter,
and we are not cogs in a cosmic machine. We should breathe in and out,
participating with all humanity out of sense of freedom and responsibility.
We should also extend this perspective to not only living beings, but also
all beings participating in the universe. To be is to participate.
REDUCTIONISM / HOLISM
Whitehead once said, “For the essence of great experience is pen-
etration into the unknown, the unexperienced” (Whitehead, 1938, p.62).
We used to portray nature with the deterministic worldview and attempted
to reach a complete description of nature.  But from now on, the modern
worldview under the Newtonian domination brings us to a limited under-
standing of nature.  Nature will not be conformed according to our ex-
pectation.  The transition from Newtonian to a new worldview has been
considered in the form of process starting with Einstein’s theory of rela-
tivity and quantum theory in the beginning of the twentieth century.  Sallie
McFague, in her article A Holistic View of Reality, described this transi-
tion from the mechanical model to a new organic model which White-
head might accept as the great experience because of its ability to pen-
etrate into the unexperienced.
In the early years of the twentieth century there was a
movement toward a model more aptly described as or-
ganic, even for the constituents with which physics deals,
for there occurred a profound realization of the deep rela-
tions between space, time, and matter, which relativized
them all….It is a considerably more complex picture than
the old view, with a hierarchy of levels of organization
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from the microworld of the subatomic through the
macroworld of the biosphere to the megaworld of inter-
galactic space.  But the characteristics of all levels of real-
ity in this picture are similar: the play of chance and neces-
sity replaces determinism; events appear to be more basic
than substances, or to phrase it differently, individuals or
entities always exist within structures of relationship; pro-
cess, change, transformation, and openness replace stasis,
changelessness, and completeness as basic descriptive
concepts.  Whereas with the model of the machine, life is
patterned on the nonliving, with the organic model the
nonliving takes on characteristics of life.  The model is
most appropriate to life, and hence the quality of life __
openness, relationship, interdependence, change, novelty,
and even mystery __ become the basic ones for interpret-
ing all reality. (McFague, 1993, p.359-360)
The model of machine, or gigantic clockwork, used to be a useful
model for most of the people for centuries ago.  From now we need a
more appropriate model that has characteristics like openness, relation-
ship, interdependence, novelty; characteristics not found in the mechani-
cal model.  With Newtonian paradigm, the scientific method could get
along with the reductionistic approach.  The word ‘mechanism’ and ‘re-
ductionism’ are interchangeable because with the mechanical worldview,
we try to reduce this huge machine into smaller parts.  Through the re-
ductionistic approach, the whole nature is understood in terms of its parts.
Briggs and Peat described metaphorically reductionism with a watch as
follows:
Essentially reductionism is a watchmaker’s view of na-
ture.  A watch can be disassembled into its component
cogs, levers, springs, and gears.  It can also be assembled
from the parts.  Reductionism imagines nature as equally
capable of being assembled and disassembled.  Reduction-
ists think of the most complex systems as made out of the
atomic and subatomic equivalents of springs, cogs, and
levers which have been combined by nature in countless
ingenious ways. (Briggs & Peat, 1989, p.21-22)
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The mechanistic view of nature seems to be very closely related
to the reductionistic approach, and thus the whole nature looks like an
aggregate of the parts.  Then, with the mechanistic worldview, the whole
is the sum of the parts.  Through the Newtonian mechanical worldview,
the historical development of the Western science has been founded on
the basis of reductionism, in which we can understand the complicated
system of the universe by studying the behavior of its component parts.
The parts and the whole have no internal relationship as Briggs and Peat
described above.  The whole can be disassembled into parts, and the parts
can be assembled to be the whole.  With this reductionistic approach,
most of the scientific works are based on quantification, abstraction, and
analysis.  The advance of scientific knowledge, then, could be considered
mostly by quantitative analysis.  Paul Davies identifies the word ‘science’
with ‘analysis’ which illustrates the scientist’s almost unquestioning habit
(Davies, 1983, p.61). The etymological meaning of the word ‘analysis’
derived from the Greek root ‘lysis’ which means ‘to break up or dissolve’
(Bohm, 1980, p.125).  With reductionism, science can get along with
deterministic causal explanation because the cosmic machine can be seen
as being completely causal and determinate.  But with the new scientific
knowledge, we realize that the mechanistic worldview is not appropriate
for our new vision of nature.  The traditional reductionistic approach has
been challenged by a new holistic approach which is based on some new
discoveries in the early period of the twentieth century.  The controversy
between reductionism and holism has been put into discussion among
many intellectuals, and an account of the two different approaches could
be seen from a dialogue in Douglas R.Hofstadter’s Godel, Escher, Bach:
An Eternal Golden Braid as follows:
Achilles: I will be glad to indulge both of you, if you will
first oblige me, by telling me the meaning of these strange
expressions, “Holism” and “Reductionism”.
Crab: Holism is the most natural thing in the world to
grasp.  It’s simply the belief that “the whole is greater than
the sum of its parts”.  No one in his right mind could reject
holism.
Anteater: Reductionism is the most natural thing in the
world to grasp.  It’s simply the belief that “a whole can be
understood completely if you understand its parts, and the
nature of their ‘sum’”.  No one in her left brain could re-
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ject reductionism.
Crab: I reject reductionism.  I challenge you to tell me,
for instance, how to understand a brain reductionistically.
Any reductionistic explanation of a brain will inevitably
fall far short of explaining where the consciousness expe-
rienced by a brain arises from.
Anteater: I reject holism.  I challenge you to tell me, for
instance, how a holistic description of an ant colony sheds
any more light on it than is shed by a description of the
ants inside it, and their roles, and their interrelationships.
Any holistic explanation of an ant colony will inevitably
fall far short of explaining where the consciousness expe-
rienced by an ant colony arises from. (Hofstadter, 1979,
p.312)
Hofstadter ended the above dialogue with his denial of the ques-
tion, “Should the world be understood via holism, or via reductionism?”
He takes some ideas from Zen.  He rejects the premises of the question
and opens the larger context to include both holism and reductionism.
Hofstadter may be right in his opening the wider context where holistic
and reductionistic interplay in the complexity of nature. We ought to leave
an old way of ‘either/or’ thinking that leads us to an extreme attitude of
‘all-or-nothing’.  Frederick Ferr?, in his article Personalistic Organism:
Paradox or Paradigm?, argues as follows:
It is not necessary to think either wholes or parts; both
are important levels for understanding.  The whole, seen
as a system, gives context and significance to its parts.
The parts, in turn, show the fine structure of the whole.
Moreover, the parts, looked at closely, are themselves each
system with fine structures of their own and therefore be-
come wholes relative to their sub-parts.  Equally, the larger,
context-conferring system, seen in its own context, is it-
self part of a still more inclusive system.  What we should
find objectionable about analytical thinking is not that it
engages in close examination of parts, or that it conceptu-
ally divides its subject matter for rigorous study, but rather
that analytical thinkers have too often lost sight of (or in-
terest in) the very contexts that give point to the analytical
Kajornpat Tangyin  127
process itself.  They have lost themselves in fascination
with the parts.  But it is not necessary to choose sides.
Epistemological holism can (and in ecological science ef-
fectively does) embrace analytical thinking, enriching de-
tailed knowledge with wider understanding even as analy-
sis provides rigour in the appreciation of detailed rela-
tions. (Ferre, 1994, p.64-65)
We have seen the limitations of the Newtonian mechanistic
worldview that reduces everything into smaller parts and separates hu-
man beings from nature.  Science in the Newtonian model is often criti-
cized as isolating man from the world and separating the subject and the
object.  The dichotomy between the subject and object, the observer and
the observed has been challenged by quantum theory especially with Bohr’s
principle of complementarity in which we are both spectators and actors.
By this principle, wave and particle are complementary properties of the
same object of human knowledge.  We cannot, simultaneously, see both
waves and particles because as one property is known, it excludes knowl-
edge of the other.  Then, our knowledge limits itself depending on the
choice we choose in measurement.  We are not separated from what knowl-
edge we acquire. The objectivity of scientific knowledge through
Newtonian science treated knowledge as ‘out there’ independently and
separately from our involvement.  But for quantum physics we are taken
into the main part of the process of acquiring knowledge. Nature is not
‘out there’ to be explored. According to quantum theory, the separated
entities of the mechanistic worldview have to be replaced with the net-
work of the interconnected, dynamic whole whose parts are
interdependant.  Bohm, in his article Postmodern Science and A
Postmodern World, argues for the interdependence of all things in the
universe as follows:
If you bring two particles together, they will gradually
modify each other and eventually become one. Conse-
quently, this approach contradicted the assumption of sepa-
rate, elementary, mechanical constituents of the universe.
In doing so, it brought in a view which I call unbroken
wholeness or flowing wholeness: it has also been called
seamless wholeness.  The universe is one seamless, un-
broken whole, and all the forms we see in it are abstracted
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by our way of looking and thinking, which is convenient
at times, helping us with our technology, for example.
(Bohm, 1988, p.62-63)
In Bohm’s idea of an unbroken wholeness, the individuality of
things appears through our abstractions from the whole.  At its root,
there is no separation between elements, and then the world is one, un-
broken wholeness.  With quantum mechanics, two subatomic particles
can interact locally and then move effectively at the distance, which is
called the nonlocality.  Einstein rejected this nonlocality until he died.
But recent experiments in quantum mechanics have begun to affirm this
nonlocality.  Following this idea of nonlocality and Bohm’s idea of unbro-
ken wholeness, we have to accept this profound implications for our view
of the universe as Davies puts it:
The mystery is all the deeper for the fact that the separa-
bility of nature is actually only approximate.  The universe
is, in reality, an interconnected whole.  The fall of an apple
on Earth is affected by, and in turn reacts upon, the posi-
tion of the moon.  Atomic elements are subject to nuclear
influences.  In both cases, however, the effects are tiny,
and can be ignored for most practical purposes.  But not
all systems are like this.  As I have explained, some sys-
tems are chaotic, and are exquisitely sensitive to the most
minute external disturbances.  It is this property that makes
chaotic system unpredictable.  Yet, even though we live in
a universe replete with chaotic systems, we are able to
filter out a vast range of physical processes that are pre-
dictable and mathematically tractable. (Davies, 1992,
p.157)
Davies describes the universe as an interconnected whole where
the holistic approach is needed.  But he still provides the place for the
mechanistic approach to play. However, with this new understanding we
need to expand our knowledge about parts to cover the interdependence
of all things in the whole.  Even though we know the technological ben-
efits that scientific reductionism has brought human society, we should be
aware of its limitations and also its negative consequences otherwise our
concern will be for only human beings, not for the wider context.  Briggs
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and Peat give a warning as follows:
The definition of a tree as a thing or part of nature com-
posed of roots, trunks, limbs, and leaves interchanging
with the environment is useful if we want to cut trees down
or plant them.  In a larger context, however, this idea may
be detrimental.  The tree is not a part.  It is impossible to
say at just what point a molecule of carbon dioxide cross-
ing the cell membrane into a leaf stops being air and be-
comes the tree.  The tree threads out into the whole envi-
ronment and eventually the whole universe.  If this fact is
ignored and forests are cut down, consequences will arise
which affect the whole ecology. Human misapprehension
about parts and whole can be not only confusing but also
dangerous. (Briggs & Peat, 1984, p.104-105)
In order to know a tree, we do not reject scientific reductionism,
that is to say, we can analyze tree into separate parts in order to know the
details of every part.  But we should not end with this, we should expand
our understanding to its environment where the tree is, the atmosphere
and everything else that relates to that tree.  The mere analysis into parts
is the narrow view of the old scientific determinism.  We need to enlarge
our perspective to cover the wider context, the evolutionary ecosystem
of our cosmos.  Eugene P. Odum, a leading ecologist as quoted by
Frederick Ferre, says: “When someone is taking too narrow a view, we
may remark that ‘he cannot see the forests for the trees’.  Perhaps a better
way to illustrate the point is to say that to understand a tree, it is neces-
sary to study both the forest of which it is a part as well as the cells and
tissues that are part of the tree” (Ferr?, 1988, p.94).  We need to expand
our understanding from the cells to the tree, from the tree the forest, from
the forest to a larger environment as much as we can.  In this ecological
perspective, we understand that the world is an endlessly complex net-
work of interdependent organic systems.  The mechanical worldview has
the presupposition that we could understand the whole by merely ab-
stracting the separated parts without considering their mutual connection
with the whole.  But we are now seeing its limitations.  Nature cannot be
totally reduced into separated parts, and nature itself expresses in com-
plexity, its unity in diversity.  It is an interconnected whole.  And this
whole is more than the sum of its parts.  Whitehead comments on the
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reductionistic approach of modern science which attempts to discover
eternal truths as follows:
The universe is not a museum with its specimens in glass
cases.  Nor is the universe a perfectly drilled regiment with
its ranks in step, marching forward with undisturbed poise.
Such notion belongs to the fable of modern science __ a
very useful fable when understood for what it is.  Science
deals with large average effects, important within certain
modes of observation.  But in the history of human thought
no scientific conclusion has ever survived unmodified by
radical increase in our subtleties of relevant knowledge.
(Whitehead, 1938, p.90)
Corresponding with Whitehead’s view of the universe, Charles
Birch, in his article Processing Towards Life, confirms the defect of sci-
entific reductionism which overlooks the importance of the whole.  He
argues:
The Whiteheadian interpretation of self-organizing enti-
ties is in contrast to the parts that make up a machine.  He
enunciated more clearly than anyone how creative evolu-
tion of living organisms cannot be understood if the ele-
ments composing them are conceived as individual enti-
ties that maintain exactly their identity throughout all the
changes and interactions, as is the case with the parts of a
machine.  That is the Newtonian model of the universe.
Complex living organisms can be broken down into their
component parts such as their cells.  How is it that the
whole has properties the components do not have?  It is
evident that the properties of the whole are not found in
the parts, except as they are organized in the whole.  It is
for this reason that the reductionist program of science is
deficient.  One response has been to say that the whole is
more than the sum of its parts.  There is an element of
truth in this statement, but it does not go far enough.  It is
not just that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.  It
is that parts become qualitatively different by being parts
of a whole. (Birch, 1998, p.286)
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The radical change from reductionism to holism has been expected
to develop our new understanding of the world in contrast to the
Newtonian mechanistic worldview since the beginning of the twentieth
century. The removal of our perspective from reductionism to holism has
been accepted as the transition from the old to the new worldview in
which Sanders describes about this movement in her The New Planning
Paradigm As Defined By The New Science (Sanders, 1998, p.147).
From To
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Mechanics of Parts Dynamics of the Whole
Linear Nonlinear
Static, cause-effect view of Dynamic, constantly changing
individual factors field of interaction
Microscopic, local Wide angle, global
Separateness Relatedness
Marketplace Environment
In the old paradigm, it was believe In the new paradigm, the parts of
that only by understanding the a system can be understood only
parts could one make sense of the in relationship to the dynamics of
whole. It also was thought that the the whole. The whole is a
worldworked like a machine with constantly changing field of
clockwork relationships, precision. connections, and patterns of
interaction.
Component thinking Seeing and thinking in wholes
Time cards, task analysis Complex adaptive systems
Problem solving Butterfly Effect, system feedback
Brainstorming Self-organization, adaptation
Polarization Environment scanning plus mapping

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According to Sanders’ description of the new paradigm, we need
to revise our perspective of nature.  Mechanism cannot be taken to be the
main part of a new vision of nature.  This new vision would need to
reestablish the relation of thought to nature.  It cannot be based on the
mechanical model alone.  Even though we have criticized the Newtonian
mechanical model, we do not intend to dispense with it.  We just need to
show its deficiencies and limitations.  It cannot be merely replaced by
holism. Holism also has its limitations. With a merely holistic approach,
we cannot know much about nature because we never find a full set of
holistic laws explaining the whole universe.  Paul Davies talks about the
limitations of the holistic view, “One of the major unsolved problems of
modern physics is whether the holistic features of a physical system re-
quire additional holistic laws that cannot be reduced to the fundamental
laws of elementary forces and particles.  So far we have no evidence for
truly holistic laws of physics” (Davies, 1983, p.225).  Bohm also insists
that the full set of laws governing the wholeness is unknown and indeed
probably unknowable (Bohm, 1980, p.178).  Bohm proposes the idea of
“explicate” and “implicate” orders to describe nature in a manner where
mechanism and holism can be viewed as co-present in the same process.
What distinguishes the explicate order is that what is thus
derived is a set of recurrent and relatively stable elements
that are outside of each other.  This set of elements (e.g.,
fields and particles) then provides the explanation of that
domain of experience in which the mechanistic order yields
an adequate treatment.  In the prevailing mechanistic ap-
proach, however, these elements, assumed to be separately
and independently existent, are taken as constituting the
basic reality.  The task of science is then to start from such
parts and to derive all wholes through abstraction, explain-
ing them as the results of interactions of the parts.  On the
contrary, where one works in terms of the implicate order,
one begins with the undivided wholeness of the universe,
and the task of science is to derive the parts through ab-
straction from the whole, explaining them as approximately
separable, stable and recurrent, but externally related ele-
ments making up relatively autonomous sub-totalities,
which are to be described in terms of an explicate order.
(Bohm, 1980, p.178-179)
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According to Bohm, the implicit and explicit orders seem to be
separated, but they actually work in the same process where the explicate
order is regarded as a particular case derived from the implicit order.
Bohm’s explicit order in implicit order can represent mechanism in ho-
lism as our new vision of nature.  Briggs and Peat further explain the
difference between the parts and the whole by using the analogy of music,
“In the sense that parts seem autonomous, they are only ‘relatively au-
tonomous’. They are like a music lover’s favorite passage in a Beethoven
symphony.  Take the passage out of the piece and it’s possible to analyze
the notes.  But in the long run, the passage is meaningless without the
symphony as a whole’ (Briggs & Peat, 1989, p.29).  We can analyze things
into pieces as many as possible in order to know the details of each piece
like we separate each note from symphony, but each piece or each note
without symphony as the whole will be meaningless.  Paul Davies, there-
fore, argues that the reductionistic approach is not adequate for our un-
derstanding of the world, and that we also need the holistic approach.
In the case of living systems, nobody would deny that an organ-
ism is a collection of atoms.  The mistake is to suppose that it is
nothing but a collection of atoms.  Such a claim is as ridiculous as
asserting that a Beethoven symphony is nothing but a collection
of notes or that a Dicken novel is nothing but a collection of words.
The property of life, the theme of a tune or the plot of a novel are
what have been called ‘emergent’ qualities.  They only emerge at
the collective level of structure, and are simply meaningless at the
component level.  The component description does not contra-
dict the holistic description; the two points of view are comple-
mentary, each valid at their own level….To say that an ant colony
is nothing but a collection of ants is to overlook the reality of
colonial behavior.  It is as absurd as saying that computer pro-
grams are not real, they are nothing but electrical pulses.  Simi-
larly, to say that a human being is nothing but a collection of cells,
which are themselves nothing but bits of DNA and so forth, which
in turn are nothing but strings of atoms and therefore conclude
that life has no significance, is muddle-headed nonsense.  Life is a
holistic phenomena. (Davies, 1983, p.62-63)
Hofstadter, with this Zen answer, rejects the idea that we should
use merely reductionism or holism to understand the world.  We now
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know that both reductionism and holism can help us reach a better under-
standing of the world.  The mechanical worldview is still a useful and
fruitful model, and we need not throw it away.  But we need to keep in
mind its limitations when we engage in scientific reductionism.  Science
cannot deny reductionism.  But it should not end with a reductionistic
approach.  Here we may paraphrase Kantian thought: reductionism with-
out holism is blind, but holism without reductionism is confused. Conse-
quently, science should expand to the interconnected network of rela-
tionship of all things in the world as Bohm puts it: “everything is inter-
nally related to everything through mutual enfoldment.  And evidently the
whole world, both society and nature, is internally related to our thinking
processes through enfoldment in our consciousness” (Bohm, 1988, p.67).
A new science would need to expand from analysis of the parts to a new
understanding of the whole.  With this new approach, we may begin to
see that reductionism and holism interpenetrates our understanding of
nature.
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